The Lautenberg Amendment: An Essential Tool for Combatting Domestic Violence by Nelson, Jodi L.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 75 Number 2 Article 7 
1-1-1999 
The Lautenberg Amendment: An Essential Tool for Combatting 
Domestic Violence 
Jodi L. Nelson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nelson, Jodi L. (1999) "The Lautenberg Amendment: An Essential Tool for Combatting Domestic 
Violence," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 75 : No. 2 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol75/iss2/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT:
AN ESSENTIAL TOOL FOR COMBATTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1996 Lautenberg Amendment,1 an addition to the Gun Control
Act of 1968,2 follows in the footsteps of the Violence Against Women
Act of 19943 by providing federal tools intended to protect victims of
domestic violence. 4 Together, these statutes strive to achieve the
congressional goal of making violence against women a major law
enforcement priority. 5 Most importantly, these statutes take aim at the
attitudes that nurture violence against women and seek to provide the
help that survivors of domestic violence need.6
Essentially, the Lautenberg Amendment makes it unlawful for any
person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence 7 to pos-
sess a gun.8 This has great practical import, especially in a state such as
1. See Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1997). The Lautenberg
Amendment prohibits ownership or possession of firearms by those convicted of a domestic violence
crime. ld Specifically, it adds misdemeanor convictions to the list of disqualifications. Id
2. See Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I) (1994 & Supp. 1997). The Gun Control
Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any court of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship or transport in
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
I,
3. The Violence Against Women Act [hereinafter "VAWA"] of 1994 is a subchapter of the
Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act. See VAWA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14016 (1994 & Supp.
1996). "Specifically, Title III of VAWA establishes a federal civil right for victims of violent,
gender-motivated crimes, providing victims with either injunctive or monetary compensation:' Yvette
J. Mabbun, Note, Title III of the Violence Against Women Act: The Answer to Domestic Violence or a
Constitutional Time-Bomb?, 29 ST. MARY's LJ. 207,210 (1997).
4. Mabbun, supra note 3, at 210.
5. See Margaret Groban, Family Violence Project, in FULL FArrTH AND CRErr CoNFERENcE
(National Council of Juvenile & Family Court Judges eds. (citing S. Rep. No. 102-197, at 34-35
(1991)). Received as part of the domestic violence research package from the North Dakota Counsel
on Abused Women's Services.
6. See id.
7. See Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 1997). The
Amendment defines "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" as an offense that is a misdemeanor
under federal or state law; and
has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a
deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the
victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is
cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or
by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.
Id. The law applies to convictions in any court. Id.
8. See Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1997).
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North Dakota, as it prevents gun uses such as hunting or simply having a
gun on the farm.9
Although much of the discussion of the Lautenberg Amendment, as
well as its background, focuses on the impact of domestic violence on
women, it also has impacts on juvenile law for several reasons.10 First,
there is a direct connection; the Amendment's definition of domestic
violence includes child abuse, meaning its strictures apply to those who
abuse their children as well as their spouses and domestic partners."
Therefore, the Amendment directly impacts juvenile law.12
Second, there is an indirect connection, as former North Dakota
Supreme Court Justice Beryl Levine discussed in Heck v. Reed,13 a 1995
case. In Heck, the court concluded that the statutory rebuttable
presumption against awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic
violence could be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 14 Levine
noted that experts have found that witnessing domestic abuse has a
negative effect on children even if they are not themselves physically
abused.1S Levine discussed other effects as well; for example, parents
suffering from abuse are less able, because of physical and emotional
injuries, to devote proper attention to their children's needs. 16 Finally,
children of abusive parents are at an increased risk of suffering abuse
themselves in the future, since "the pattern of spouse abuse usually
precedes the abuse of the child."17 Thus, because it seeks to reduce the
effects of domestic violence, the Lautenberg Amendment has important
implications for juvenile law.i 8
The Lautenberg Amendment has been controversial, however; this is
in part because it provides no exemption for law enforcement, military
or government officials. 19 This lack of exemptions in the Lautenberg
9. See id. (prohibiting ownership or possession of firearms by those convicted of a domestic
violence crime). See also Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 925 (1994 & Supp. 1997)
(listing the exceptions to the Lautenberg Amendment wherein hunting or farm use is not included).
10. For a discussion of the background of the Lautenberg Amendment, see part IL infra.
11. See supra note7.
12. See supra note7.
13. 529 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995).
14. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 166 (N.D. 1995) (interpreting N.D. Catr. CoDE § 14-09-
06.2(1)j) (1993). which creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody of a child to a
perpetrator of domestic abuse). See also Kathleen B. Garner, Comment, Applying the Rebuttable
Presumption Against Awarding Custody to Perpetrators of Domestic Violence, 72 N.D. L. REV. 155
(1996) (discussing the Heck decision).
15. Heck, 529 N.W.2d at 163 (referring to "the growing body of research which teaches that
children are victimized by the climate of violence between their parents, even if they are not direct
targets of the abuse") (citations omitted).
16. See id. at 164 (citing Karen Czapansldy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering
Process: Lessonsfrom Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1993)).
17. See id.
18. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
19. Lautenberg Amendment of 1996. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (Supp. 1997) (listing the exceptions
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Amendment conflicts with The Gun Control Act of 1968 which does
provide exemptions for these individuals when convicted of a domestic
violence felony.20 This has resulted in a number of constitutional attacks
on the Amendment. 21 One of these challenges partially, and briefly,
succeeded recently, as the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia found the Amendment, in part, violates the Equal
Protection Clause 22 of the U.S. Constitution23 because the Amendment
to the Lautenberg Amendment; law enforcement, military and government officials are not included).
This is the most distinguishing factor between the Lautenberg Amendment and The Gun Control Act of
1968, which does provide that domestic abuse felons in the military, law enforcement or a government
official capacity may retain their firearms in their official capacity. See Lautenberg Amendment of
1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Star. 3009-372 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1))
(amending the Gun Control Act of 1968 to remove the exception for law enforcement, military, or
government officials who commit a domestic abuse misdemeanor). But see 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1)
(including domestic abuse felonies as crimes for which law enforcement, military, or government
personnel receive an exemption).
20. See Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-372 (1996) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1)) (eliminating those exemptions for law enforcement military, or
government officials who are convicted of a domestic abuse misdemeanor). But see 18 U.S.C. §
925(a)(1) (excluding domestic abuse felonies from those crimes which are not granted exemptions).
21. Police have been a major force in these challenges, as there is a possibility that a police
officer could lose his or her job if unable to possess a firearm. Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis
captures all of the various constitutional challenges to the Amendment. Gillespie v. City of
Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp.2d 811, 819-28 (S.D. Ind. 1998) Gillespie, a police officer, was convicted of
a misdemeanor battery offense involving domestic violence against his ex-wife. Id. at 814. As a
result of this conviction, Gillespie could not possess a firearm under the Lautenberg Amendment, and
he was therefore unable to continue in his usual official capacity as a police officer. Id. at 814-15.
Gillespie claimed this violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms both as an individual and as a
police officer. See id. at 826. Additionally. Gillespie contended the Lautenberg Amendment violated
the Tenth Amendment on the grounds that it invaded state sovereignty and state criminal law by
defining the crime of domestic violence and its penalties. See id at 819. See also National Ass'n of
Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1997). Gillespie also advanced a
due process argument, claiming section 922(g)(9) of the Amendment arbitrarily and without due
process took his right to bear arms. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 825. See also United States v.
Hicks, 992 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (D. Kan. 1997); Barrett. 968 F. Supp. at 1572. 1575. Gillespie also
claimed the Lauteneberg Amendment was an ex post facto violation, contending section 922(g)(9)
retroactively punishes offenders for prior domestic violence crimes. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at
825. See also Hicks, 992 F. Supp. at 1245; United States v. Meade, 986 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D. Mass.
1997); Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1576. Next, Gillespie tried to persuade the court that the Lautenberg
Amendment constituted an equal protection violation by providing a harsher penalty for
misdemeanants than for felons. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 822. See also Fraternal Order of
Police v. United States (Fraternl Order of Police 1), 152 F.3d 998, 1002-03 (D.C. Cir. 1998). rev'd,
173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Barren, 968 F. Supp. at 1572-73. Gillespie also raised the Commerce
Clause, as he claimed the Lautenberg Amendment exceeded Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 821. See also Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1572. Gillespie also
advanced a bill of attainder argument, as he claimed the Lautenberg Amendment violates US. Comsr.
art. I, § 9, cl. 3, which states that no bill of attainder or ex post facto" law shall be passed. See
Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 825. See also Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1575-76. A bill of attainder is a "law
that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without
provision of the protection of a judicial trial." Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1576 n.19. Finally, Gillespie
asserted that the Lautenberg Amendment was a violation of the Contract Clause of Article I, § 10, cl
I of the U.S. Constitution which states: "No state shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts... ." See Gillespie, 13 F.Supp.2d at 827. Gillespie contended that section 922(g)(9) -is
"compelled state legislation" that "operates to substantially impair Plaintiff's oath-based contractual
obligations:' Id.
22. Equal Protection Clauses are found in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution. See U.S. CONS'. amend. V; U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. The analysis for equal
protection is substantially identical under both amendments in that a law may neither burden a
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unlike allows no exemptions for law enforcement, military or
government officials. 24 The court found that providing a harsher
penalty for a misdemeanor than for a felony violates the Equal
Protection Clause.25 As a result of this decision, domestic abusers in law
enforcement, the military or the government were once again allowed to
possess a firearm.26 However the picture was confused again, in April,
when the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, reheard the case,
reversed the initial decision and found the Lautenberg Amendment
survived the Equal Protection Challenge.27 This new decision once again
took guns from domestic abusers, and also adds to the confusion about
the Amendment's constitutionality.
This Note addresses the background of the Lautenberg Amend-
ment, as well as recent challenges to it and possible responses to these
challenges. Part I comprises an introduction to the Lautenberg Amend-
ment's history and content, as well as those of its predecessors, the Gun
Control Act of 196828 and the VAWA of 1994.29 Part III discusses why
the Lautenberg Amendment, despite providing absolutely no
exemptions, is indeed necessary to combat domestic violence.30 This
includes an examination of state laws, including those of North Dakota,
which are simply insufficient to handle the problem of domestic
violence.3 l
fundamental right nor target a suspect class. See Fraternal Order of Police 1, 152 F.3d at 1002. A
legislative classification is upheld so long as it 'bears a rational relation to some legitimate end:' Id.
23. See U.S. CoNSr. amend. XIV, § 1. See also Fraternal Order of Police 1, 152 F~d at 1004
(holding that the lack of exemptions in the Lautenberg Amendment for police officers, military and
government officials convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors violated such persons' equal
protection because those classifications were exempted from the Gun Control Act banning firearm
possession for domestic violence felons).
24. See Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §925(a)(1) (Supp. 1997).
25. See Fraternal Order of Police I. 152 F.3d at 1002.
26. I. at 1004. In Fraternal Order of Police I, the court held that:
[Section 925] is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to withhold the public
interest exception from those convicted of domestic violence
misdemeanors. The government may not bar such people from possessing
firearms in the public interest while it imposes a lesser restriction on those
convicted of crimes that differ only in being more serious.
Id.
27. Fraternal Order of Police v. United States (Fraternal Order of Police H), 173 F.3d 898, 901
(D.C. Cir. 1999), rev'g, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The court began by noting, "[Alt the outset of.
. [another] opinion in which a panel on petition for rehearing abandoned its initial view, we quoted
Justice Frankfurter's remark, 'Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely
because it comes late.' It still seems good advice." Id. at 900-01 (citations omitted).
28. Gun Control Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994).
29. VAWA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14016 (1994).
30. See Lautenberg Amendment of 1996. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (Supp. 1997).
31. See N.D. CEtr. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (1997) (providing for domestic violence protection
orders); N.D. Ctr. CODE § 14-07.1-03 (1997) (providing for temporary protection orders); N.D.
CE'r. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (1997) (establishing penalties for violating a protection order); N.D. CETr.
CODE § 14-07.1-13 (1997) (stating that a person charged with a domestic violence crime may be
prohibited from having contact with the victim if a protection order under § 14-07.1-02 or §
14-07.1-03 does not already exist); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-01-02 (1995) (demanding seizure of a
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Part IV of this Note will provide an overview of the numerous
claims of constitutional violations by the Lautenberg Amendment, and
the courts' rejection of those claims. 32 This section will also discuss the
recent holdings of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in
Fraternal Order of Police v. United States,33 both initially and on
rehearing, that partially invalidated and then restored the Amendment.34
Finally, Part V will discuss both why it is essential that there be no
exemptions from the Lautenberg Amendment and how this can be done
without violating the United States Constitution.
II. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW:
THE GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN ACT, AND THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT
In 1968, Congress enacted the Gun Control Act, the first of three
federal statutes aimed at combating domestic violence. 35 Congress
continued its efforts in 1994 with the Violence Against Wormen Act36
and in 1996 with the Lautenberg Amendment.37 This trilogy of federal
statutes enables the federal government to assist in combating crimes of
domestic violence, over which it has historically lacked jurisdiction.38
dangerous weapon or firearm used or possessed in the act of a felony or misdemeanor involving
violence or intimidation); N.D. CEw'. CODE § 62.1-02-01 (1995) (disallowing any person convicted of
a felony or misdemeanor involving violence or intimidation from owning a firearm for a period of five
years). All of these statutes provide for remedies after an act of violence has occurred. See N.D.
Cvra. CODE §§ 14-07.1-02, -03, -06, -13; N.D. CENT CODE § 62.1-01-02; N.D. CErNT CODE §
62.1-02-01. In contrast, the Lautenberg Amendment seeks to prevent violence by removing guns from
the hands of domestic abusers before they have a chance to use them against their victims. See
Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1997) (stating that "(ilt shall be
unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence" to possess a firearm).
32. See supra note 21.
33. 152 F.3d 998.1004 (D.C. Cir. 1998). rev'd, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
34. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States (Fraternal Order of Police I), 152 F.3d 998,
1004 (D.C. Cir. 1998). rey'd, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the lack of exemptions in the
Lautenberg Amendment for police officers, military and government officials convicted of domestic
violence misdemeanors violated the Equal Protection Clause because these classifications were
exempted from the Gun Control Act, which also bans firearm possession for domestic violence
felonies) and Fraternal Order of Police v. United States (Fraternal Order of Police II), 173 F.3d 898,
901 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev'g. 152 F.d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (overturning Fraternal Order of Police I
and reinstating suhimary judgment for United States granted by the district court).
35. The Gun Control Act prohibits domestic violence felons from possessing firearms. See Gun
Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994). The Violence Against Women Act provides civil
remedies to victims of gender-motivated crime. See VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). The
Lautenberg Amendment prohibits domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing firearns. See 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
36. See VAWA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14016 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
38. See Groban, supra note 5 (citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 34-35 (1991)). Received as part of
the domestic violence research package from the North Dakota Counsel on Abused Women's
Services.
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A. Tim GuN CONTROL ACT OF 1968
The first piece of federal legislation concerned with domestic
violence was the Gun Control Act of 1968.39 This Act expressly
prohibits convicted felons, drug addicts, minors, mentally ill people,
anyone dishonorably discharged from the military, undocumented
immigrants and people who have renounced their U.S. citizenship from
buying or owning a gun.40 It was the first federal legislation to limit an
individual's Second Amendment right to bear arms. 41
The Gun Control Act was primarily intended to create more federal
control over interstate and foreign commerce involving firearms and to
assist the states in fighting such commerce. 42 Congress found increased
federal control necessary due to the increasing rate of crime and the
growing use of firearms in violent crime.43 Combating domestic
violence is mentioned nowhere in the purpose listed for the enactment of
this legislation. 4 However, the Gun Control Act affected the problem of
domestic violence, as a conviction for a domestic violence felony
triggered the Act's provisions, preventing the perpetrator from
possessing a firearm. 45
An important aspect of the Gun Control Act, and one that plainly
distinguishes it from the Lautenberg Amendment, is that it contains
exemptions for government employees, law officers, and members of the
military who use firearms in their official duties. 46 The Lautenberg
Amendment, contrarily, contains no such exemptions.4 7 Thus, under the
Gun Control Act, a police officer convicted of a domestic violence
felony was allowed to retain a firearm because it was necessary for his
job.48 However, under the Lautenberg Amendment, the same police
officer convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor is not allowed to
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (prohibiting anyone convicted of a felony, including a domestic
violence felony, from owning a firearm).
40. Gun Control Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
41. See Melanie L. Mecka, Seizing the Ammunition from Domestic Violence: Prohibiting the
Ownership of Firearms by Abusers, 29 Rurmats L. REV. 607,607 (1998).
42. H.R. Rep. 90-1577 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410,4411 (stating the primary
purposes of the Gun Control Act was "to strengthen Federal controls over interstate and foreign
commerce in firearms and to assist the States effectively to regulate firearms traffic within their
borders").
43. See id, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4411.
44. See id, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410,4411.
45. See Gun Control Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994).
46. q. Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Star. 3009-372 (1996) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (Supp. 1997)) (removing those exemptions for law enforcement,
military, and government officials that were not present in the original "Gun Control Act').
47. See Lautenberg Amendment of 1996. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (Supp. 1997).
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (amended in 1996 to eliminate all exemptions for law
enforcement, government, and military employees).
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retain a firearm, even though it may be necessary for his job.49 This
difference between the Gun Control Act and the Lautenberg
Amendment led the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
initially to find the Lautenberg Amendment unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds.50
Although the Gun Control Act indirectly aids in the battle against
domestic violence, it falls short of providing an adequate remedy to
victims of such violence. 51 The Act only provides a remedy for felonies,
and most domestic violence crimes are never classified as such. 52
Therefore, the Act does not prevent most domestic violence offenders
from owning guns.53
B. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WoMaN Acr OF 1994
As mentioned, the Gun Control Act provides federal assistance in
the war against crime generally, but not the war against domestic vio-
lence crime in particular.54 It was not until 1994 that Congress enacted
legislation specifically in response to the growing problem of domestic
violence. 55 This particular legislation was the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA).56
49. See 18 U.S.C. j 925(a)(1). This section of the Lautenberg Amendment provides for limited
relief from the disabilities the Amendment overall imposes:
The provisions of this chapter. except for sections 922(d)(9) and 922(g)(9) [the sections
relating to domestic violence] and provisions relating to firearms subject to the
prohibitions of section 922(p), shall not apply with respect to the transportation, shipment,
receipt, possession, or importation of any firearm or ammunition imported for, sold or
shipped to, or issued for the use of, the United States or any department or agency
thereof or any State or any department, agency, or political subdivision thereof.
ICE
50. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States (Fraternal Order of Police I), 152 F.3d 998,
1004 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev'd, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999). A more detailed discussion of this case
appears in Part IV, infra.
51. See 142 CoNG. REc. S10380-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray) (stating
that most domestic violence offenders are never convicted of a felony due to outdated or ineffective
laws that often treat domestic violence as a lesser offense). Thus, if there is no felony conviction,
there can be no remedy under the Gun Control Act. See Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) (1994).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
53. See id.
54. See id. (neglecting to recognize domestic violence in its original enactment). See also H.R.
Rep. 90-1577 (1968). repfinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4411.
55. See VAWA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14016 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
56. See id. VAWA was enacted to "combat the growing and widespread epidemic of domestic
violence." See Mabbun, supra note 3. at 208. It was designed to provide remedies to gender-
motivated crime such as domestic violence and to remedy the prejudices that lurk behind it. See &
REP. No. 103-138 (1993).
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The primary purpose of VAWA was to fight domestic violence.57 It
does this primarily by establishing "a federal civil right for victims of
violent, gender-motivated crimes, providing victims with either injunctive
or monetary compensation."ss Thus, the key to VAWA is that it
specifically provides relief for any gender-motivated crimes,5 9 not just
for those of domestic violence.60
Other provisions of VAWA also seek to further the goal of fighting
gender-motivated crimes.61 For example, portions of VAWA provide
"federal grants to states willing to implement pro-arrest policies and
training and education programs in domestic violence for judges,
prosecutors, and law enforcement officers." 62 Further, VAWA provides
training for federal judges on sexual assault and domestic violence
issues.63
Like the Gun Control Act, however, VAWA has limitations that keep
it from being completely effective. 64 First, VAWA requires both a
"crime of violence" 65 and a proven gender-related motivation for that
57. See id. A woman is beaten by her husband or boyfriend once every 15 seconds in this
country. See 142 CoNe. REc. S12341-01 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (citing FBI
crime statistics). Domestic violence claims the lives of four women every day. See id. Every six
minutes a woman is raped in the United States. See Mabbun, supra note 3, at 209 (citing S. REP. No.
101-545. at 27 (1990)). See also id. at 208 n.2 (citing S. REP. No. 102-197. at 36 (1991), documenting
growth of domestic violence). "Only sixteen months after VAWA was introduced in June of 1990, the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported that incidents of sexual assault against women increased
by approximately 1.3 million, and an estimated 4 million more women were abused in their homes. ' Id.
"The Committee stated: "The urgency [for a response] reflects not only the increasing number of
victims, but also the puzzling persistence of public policies, laws, and attitudes that treat some crimes
against women less seriously than other violent crimes."' I. Congress enacted VAWA to address tis
day-by-day violence that women from every socio-economic background experience. See Mabbun,
supra note 3, at 208 n.2 (citing S. REP. No. 101-545. at 27-28 (1990)).
58. See Mabbun, supra note 3, at 210. See also VAWA, 18 U.S.C. § 2264. Unlike the Gun
Control Act, VAWA mandates that the court order restitution:
[Tihe [c]ourt [in a VAWA case] must order restitution after conviction to reimburse the
victim for the full amount of losses. These losses include costs for medical or
psychological care, physical therapy, transportation, temporary housing, child care, lost
income, attorney's fees, costs incurred in obtaining a civil protection order, and any
other losses suffered by the victims as a result of the offense. In a conviction under the
Gun Control Act, the court may order restitution.
Groban, supra note 5. Received as part of the domestic violence research package from the North
Dakota Counsel on Abused Women's Services.
59. See VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d) (1994) (defining the term "crime of violence motivated by
gender" to mean a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due,
at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender). Id. See also Mabbun, supra note 3, at 220
n.47.
60. See Mabbun, supra note 3, at 210. See also VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (1994).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 13701. See also Mabbun, supra note 3, at 211-12.
62. Mabbun, supra note 3, at 211-12.
63. See VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 14001-14002 (1994). See also Mabbun, supra note 3, at 211 n.17.
64. VAWA, like the Gun Control Act, provides only remedies after the violence has occurred
and offers no preventative measures against domestic abusers. See 42 U.S.C. §13981 (providing civil
relief to women only after they have become victims of domestic violence).
65. See S. REP'. No. 103-138, § 3 (1993).
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violence.66 The woman who seeks relief under VAWA must demonstrate
that she was attacked because she was a woman and "that the attacker
was motivated, at least in part, by her gender." 67 This is difficult to
prove, meaning VAWA "will exclude many of the victims it hopes to
assist." 68 Further, the Act does not create a general federal law for all
assaults or rapes against women, and the remedy it provides is limited to
federal and state felonies. 69 As the law does not address domestic
violence misdemeanors, it offers victims of such misdemeanors no
protection or retribution.7 0 Most important, however, VAWA only
provides remedies for victims of gender-motivated crimes, and thus it
does not seek to prevent violence against women before it starts.71
C. Tm LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT
As a supplement to VAWA, and to prevent domestic violence rather
than merely to provide remedies for it, a bill was introduced at the
second session of the 104th Congress.72 This bill, which became known
as the Lautenberg Amendment, would take firearms out of the hands of
persons convicted of domestic violence crimes. 73 Specifically, the
Amendment makes it illegal for any person convicted of a domestic
violence misdemeanor to possess a firearm.74 Additionally, the
Amendment prohibits firearm ownership by persons under a court order
to restrain from harassing, stalking, or otherwise threatening an intimate
66. See id.
67. Id. § 3. "Judges and juries will determine 'motivation' from the 'totality of the
circumstances' surrounding the event." Id. § 4.
68. See Mabbun, supra note 3, at 209 n. 2 (citing Birgit Schmidt Am Busch, Domestic Violence
and Title 111 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1993: A Feminist Critique, 6 HASTINs WOMEN'S
LJ. 1. 9 (1995)).
69. VAWA "does not expand Federal jurisdiction to all attacks against women . . .
Discriminatory motivation is clearly required... and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that
motivation. A plaintiff must prove that the crime of violence-whether an assault, a kidnapping, or a
rape-was motivated by gender." .RE. No. 103-138, § 3@b). Additionally, VAWA's civil rights
provisions are "strictly limited to felonious crimes of violence. Specifically, the crime of violence
which is proven to be motivated, at least in part, by an animus toward the victim's gender must also be
an act that would constitute: (1) a Federal or State felony against the person; or (2) felony against the
property that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another." Id. § 3(e).
70. See id.
71. See VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
72. See Mecka, supra note 41, at 629. The Lautenberg Amendment was introduced to the 104th
Congress on May 14, 1996 by Senator Lautenberg, Democrat of New Jersey. See Mecka, supra note
41, at 630.
73. See Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1997).
74. See id. Section 922(g)(9) specifically states:
It shall be unlawful for any person.., who is convicted in any court of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm
or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
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partner.7 5 Unlike other laws forbidding persons to own guns, 7 6 the
Lautenberg Amendment provides no exceptions for police, military
personnel or government officials.77 This has proved to be its most
controversial aspect.78
The Gun Control Act of 1968 and VAWA of 1994 were positive
steps in the fight against domestic violence.79 VAWA in particular must
not be overlooked, as it provides much-needed remedies to victims of
domestic violence.80 Despite such efforts, however, statistical data and
other factors suggest that domestic violence and society's acceptance of
it are still widespread and pervasive.8'
75. See Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (Supp. 1997). This provision of
the Lautenberg Amendment states:
It shall be unlawful for any person... who is subject to a court order that (A) was issued
after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person
had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or
threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or
person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable
fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i) includes a finding that such person
represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii)
by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily
injury.
Il
76. See generally Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994). The Gun Control Act
prohibits convicted felons, drug addicts, minors, mentally ill people, anyone dishonorably discharged
from the military, undocumented immigrants and people who have renounced their U.S. citizenship
from buying or owning a gun. See id.
77. See Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (1997). See also Jonathan
Kerr, Critics Say Anti-Domestic Violence Amendment Takes Shot at Police, WEsT's LEGAL News,
Dec. 2, 1996, at *1, available in 1996 WL 684742.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 182-203.
79. See Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). See also VAWA, 42 U.S.C. §§
13931-14016 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
80. See VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (1994).
81. See Mabbun, supra note 3, at 209-10 nn.7-8 (citing NANmHu'rc/os.TiEVtLErFAMI=Y:
VicroTrzImoN oF WoMEN, CHiRamR AND ELDs 18 (1988) (asserting that growth of domestic violence
has numbed society's awareness of the problem)). Mabbun discusses Hutchings' ideas suggesting that
gender stereotyping is one cause of society's lethargy in dealing with domestic violence. Mabbun,
supra note 3, at 210 n.8 (citing Hu'rcHINs, supra, at 18-23). She notes, "Hutchings asserts that
developmental theories taught to medical health professionals have been based on Freudian theories of
psychosexual development. Freudian theories espoused the views that man is physically superior and
sexually aggressive, while the woman's role is deemed passive and receptive.' Mabbun, supra note 3,
at 210 n.8 (citing HuTcHiNos, supra, at 18) (concluding that Freudian theories translated into
widespread belief that women derived sexual pleasure from abuse). See also LiMs OKUN,WOM
AnusE: FAcTs REPLAcwro MYTs 12 (1986) (reasoning that medical and police categorization of
injuries is a factor contributing to the under-reporting of domestic violence). Further, Mabbun writes,
"Doctors often designate injuries incurred from domestic abuse as 'accidental,' 'traumatic,' or
sustained from an 'unspecified origin' ... Further, police label assaults between intimates as 'domestic
disturbances' or 'family trouble,' and therapists categorize psychological problems inflicted by
domestic abuse as 'depression,' 'paranoia' or 'anxiety neuroses."' Mabbun, supra note 3, at 210 n.8
(citing OKUN, supra, at 12-13). Some scholars note that the idea of the "family ideal" is the most
consistent barrier to abuse reform. See EUZAEIH PLECK, DoMEsrc TYRANNY 7 (1987). "The 'family
ideal' is defined as unrelated but distinct concepts relating to the privacy of the family, stability of the
home and the right of access to children by parents and spouses. . . A crucial element of the 'family
1999] NOme 375
According to 1996 statistics, a woman is beaten by her husband or
boyfriend once every fifteen seconds in this country.8 2 Domestic
violence claims the lives of four women every day.8 3 These disturbing
statistics persist despite increased public and judicial awareness of
domestic violence.84 In North Dakota alone, 5,920 incidents of domestic
violence were reported to crisis intervention centers in 1997.85
As many politicians and commentators have noted, guns and
domestic violence go hand in hand.86 Guns represent the essence of the
intimidation used in domestic violence: "While firearms can be used to
physically harm a battered woman, they also can be used to instill fear
and terror." 87 The mere presence of a gun offers the means to escalate
an abusive argument into a homicide.8s
Supporters of the Lautenberg Amendment sought to create a legal
tool to help combat these high rates of gun-related domestic violence.89
These supporters believed removing guns from the hands of abusers is
an essential first step in protecting victims of domestic violence.90
ideal' is the belief in the separate, private nature of the family unit.' See Mabbun, supra note 3, at 210
n.8 (citing PLECK, supra, at 8) ("asserting that the 'family ideal' concept results in less government
intervention in family affairs").
82. See 142 CoNo. REc. S12341-01 (daily ed. OcL 3.1996) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
83. See id.
84. See Jonathan Kerr, Abuse Forum: Domestic Violence Still Judicial Shame, West's Legal
News, Dec. 2, 1996, at *1, available in 1996 WL 694927.
85. See NORTH DAKOTA COUNCIL ON AaUSED WOMEN'S SEavicEs, FACTS ABOUT DomFsnTzc
VIOLENCE IN NORTH DAKOTA (199T)
86. See 142 CoNG. Rmc. S10379-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray). "Every
year, an estimated 2 million women are victimized by domestic violence... and [o]f these 2 million,
nearly 6,000 die." Id. "And 70 percent of the time, the perpetrators of the deadly violence use a
gun.'" Id. In North Dakota, "Sixty-nine percent of female deaths in domestic violence incidents
involved firearms, while 32 percent of female deaths in non-domestic violence incidents involved
firearns:' ATTORNEY GENERAL HEIDI HEITKAMP, CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPo T
HOMICIDE IN NORTH DAKOTA, 1997, at 11. According to the North Dakota Attorney General's statistics,
"Persons killed in domestic violence incidents were more likely to be killed with a firearm than those
killed in non-domestic incidents:' Id.
87. Family Violence Prevention Fund, Firearms and Domestic Violence, 4 SEAKINo UP: THE
FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVEmToN FuND's News AND TIPS FOR TmE DoMEnc VIOLENCE Comm.uNrry, Aug. 6,
1998, at 1.
88. See id. at 2.
89. See 142 CONa.REC. S10379-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray). See
also Heitkanp, supra note 86, at 11. See supra note 86 for texL
90. See 142 CONG. R EC. S 10379-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement by Sen. Murray). "The
gun is the key ingredient most likely to turn a domestic violence incident into a homicide." Id.
Particularly, one victim had an ex-husband who was physically abusive and had been convicted of
misdemeanors.
[One abuser] knew he was prone to violence against his family, and did not trust himself.
He purposely separated the gun and the bullets at two different ends of their house, so he
would not be able to shoot her in the heat of the moment. But the measures he took were
not quite enough, when he came home one night, drunk, and yelling that the house wasn't
clean enough for him. Because he was able to find the bullets, find the gun, load it, and
point it at his wife. That she is alive today is a miracle. [Additional research states that]
nearly 65 percent of all murder victims known to have been killed by intimates were shot
to death. We have seen that firearms-associated family and intimate assaults are 12
times more likely to be fatal than those not associated with firearms. A California study
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I. THE NEED FOR UNIFORM FEDERAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
LAW
Many opponents of the Lautenberg Amendment view it as another
step towards "Federalism" 91 and therefore a federal invasion into state
sovereignty. 92 However, as this Note will discuss, the Amendment is
absolutely necessary because of the lack or insufficiency of other
remedies. 93 For example, some states do not recognize rape of a spouse
as a criminal act or do not accord rape felony status.94 Therefore, a
uniform federal law is essential.
A. Ti INSUFCIENCY OF EXISTING STATE LAW
Existing state law is insufficient to deal with domestic violence for
several reasons. First, while federal law has long prohibited firearm
possession by convicted felons, 95 "[It] is an unfortunate fact that many
showed when a domestic violence incident is fatal, 68 percent of the time the homicide
was done with a firearm.
Id.
91. "Federalism" can be defined as "federal control;" critics of the Amendment use the term to
refer to federal control of the individual states. See WFBsrEWs NEw INiERNATIONAL DICnONARY (3d
ed. 1986).
92. See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp.2d 811, 819 (S.D. Ind. 1998). Gillespie
claims that the Lautenberg Amendment invades state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment
by supplanting state criminal law by defining the crime of domestic violence and establishing
substantive penalties for such offense. See id. Gillespie also asserted the Lautenberg Amendment
violates the Tenth Amendment because it supplants state civil law by dictating qualifications of state
and local law enforcement officials and imposes a duty on States to serve as implements of regulation.
See id. See also National Association of Government Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564,
1577 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (arguing that the Lautenberg Amendment usurps powers reserved to the states
by the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
93. Crimes of domestic violence in many states have not been lifted to the level of a felony. See
142 CoNG. REc. H10434-01 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Mrs. Schroeder). In addition,
if a domestic violence offender is charged with a felony, it is often reduced to a misdemeanor. See
142 CONG. REc. S10377-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
94. In Arizona and Connecticut, it is a defense to a prosecution for sexual abuse, sexual assault
of a minor, or sexual assault that the alleged offender was the spouse of the victim at the time of the
commission of the act. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D) (1989 & Supp. 1998); CONN. GE.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 1994). Additionally, in Arizona, sexual assault is a class two felony. See
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (1989 & Supp. 1998). A first offense sexual assault against a spouse,
however, is only a class six felony, and the judge has discretion to enter judgment for the conviction as
a class one misdemeanor with mandatory counseling. See AR.M REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(B).
(1989 & Supp. 1998). In Delaware, if an alleged rape victim was a voluntary social
companion/spouse of the accused or if she had sexual intercourse with him within 12 months prior to
the alleged rape, it is not classified as a crime of rape even though it occurs without the victim's
consent. See DFt.. CoDEANN. tit. 11, § 775 (1995 & Supp. 1998). In Montana, only forced sexual
intercourse is a felony; all other types of sexual assault are punishable only by a fine not to exceed
$500 with no more than six months in jail. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (1997). Tennessee
allows a claim for spousal rape only if the defendant is armed or reasonably believed to be armed,
causes bodily injury, or the spouses were living apart at the time of the rape and one has filed for
separate maintenance or divorce. See TENN. CODE Ame. § 39-13-507 (1997).
95. See Gun Control Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994). The Gun Control Act prohibits
felons, drug addicts, minors, mentally ill people, anyone dishonorably discharged from the military,
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domestic violence offenders are never convicted of a felony [at the state
level]. Outdated or ineffective [state] laws often treat domestic violence
as a lesser offense." 96 This occurs in part because domestic violence
felons are often allowed to reduce the felony to a misdemeanor by plea
bargaining. 97 Consequently, as Senator Lautenberg stated, "If you beat
up or batter your neighbor's wife, it is a felony. If you beat up, batter, or
brutalize your own wife or your own child, it is a misdemeanor."98
Another example of insufficient state law is that some states do not
have a specific classification for crimes of domestic violence. 99 In other
words, a man who beats his wife or child may be found guilty of an
assault, but not specifically a domestic assault.100 This lack of domestic
crime classification in some states has allowed perpetrators to argue that
the Lautenberg Amendment cannot apply to them, as it only applies to
domestic violence misdemeanants.101 Courts have rejected this argument
by interpreting the Amendment's reference to a "misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence" not to require that the state crime actually have a
domestic relationship element or be classified as a domestic violence
crime.02 Thus, if a state statute does not provide categories for domestic
undocumented immigrants and people who have renounced their U.S. citizenship from buying or
owning a gun. See id
96. 142 CoNG. Rac. S10380 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). See also 142
CoNG. REc. H10434-01 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder).
Our biggest problem is many States have not lifted domestic violence convictions to the
level of a felony. They consider them a misdemeanor. Other States have allowed
people, even though it is considered a felony, to plead guilty to a lesser crime.
Therefore, when they do the checks for whether or not you should be able to buy a gun,
an awful lot of people who have been convicted of domestic violence problems are able
to escape.
142 CONG. REc. H10434-01 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder):
97. See 142 CONG. REC. S10377-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
See also 142 CoNe. REc. H10434-01 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder); 142
Cotq.Rrc. S10379-01 (September 12, 1996) (Statement of Sen. Murray) (stating that "plea bargains
often result in misdemeanor convictions for what are really felon crimes").
98. Id. 142 CONG. Rec. S 10377-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
99. See generally United States v. Meade, 986 F. Supp. 66 (D. Mass. 1997). In this case, the
defendant had been convicted of a misdemeanor for assault and battery upon his wife. See id at 67.
He argued, however, that the Lautenberg Amendment did not apply to his past conviction for assault
and battery under Massachusetts law because the state statute does not require a familial relationship
between the parties as an element of the state crime. See id See also United States v. Smith, 964 F.
Supp. 286, 290-91 (D. Iowa 1997). In an Iowa case, the defendant had been convicted of a
misdemeanor assault against his wife. See Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 288. Although the defendant could
have been charged under the state's new domestic assault statute, he was charged with only a simple
assault. See id. A few years later, the defendant shot his wife and was convicted for being a domestic
violence misderneanant in possession of a firearm. See Id. He argued that the Lautenberg
Amendment did not apply to him because he was not convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor
per se. See Id
100. See id.
101. See id.
102, See Meade, 986 F. Supp. at 68. See also Smith 964 F. Supp. at 290 (holding that the court
believes the use of force requirement and the domestic relationship requirement of the Lautenberg
Amendment are two separate elements).
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violence offenses, or if the offense is plea bargained from a domestic
violence crime to a lesser offense, the Amendment still applies.10 3
Therefore, the Lautenberg Amendment helps to close dangerous
loopholes in domestic violence law by providing uniformity.104
Additionally, the Amendment picks up the slack left by state laws that
either do not have a category for domestic violence crimes or allow them
to be pleabargained down to lesser offenses.1 05
B. NORTH DAKOTA'S RESPONSE TO Doir STic VIOLENCE: A GOOD
EFFORT BUT STILL INADEQUATE
North Dakota has not ignored the problem of domestic violence,
and the legislature has passed a number of laws addressing the
problem.106 While North Dakota's domestic violence laws do not
provide the loopholes of other states, 107 its laws still fall short.108 Just
103. See Meade, 986 F. Supp. at 68. In Meade, the United States District Court from
Massachusetts referred to the legislative history behind the Lautenberg Amendment. See id. The
court stated:
Senator Lautenberg's statements make clear that the phrase 'has, as an element' relates
to state crimes that involve an element of force. The legislative history reveals that 'has,
as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or threatened use of a deadly
weapon' was added to the statute shortly before passage . ..Therefore, Senator
Lautenberg did not intend that the language 'as an element' would apply to the domestic
relationship requirement.
Id. at 68-69 (citing 142 CoNG. Rec. S11872-01 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg)).
104. See Meade. 986 F.Supp. at 68. The District Court from the District of Massachusetts cited
the legislative history of the Lautenberg Amendment. The court stated:
the amendment was proposed to remedy the disparate treatment between those convicted
of a felony involving domestic assault and those convicted of a misdemeanor involving
domestic assault. The sponsor of the legislation, Senator Lautenberg, stated that 'This
amendment would close this dangerous loophole and keep guns away from violent
individuals wo threaten their own families.'
Id. (citing 142 CoNe. Rc. S10377-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
105. See id. The District Court for the District of Massachusetts stated: "'[t]his amendment
looks to the type of crime, rather than the classification of the conviction. Anyone convicted of a
domestic violence offense would be prohibited from possessing a firearm." Id. (quoting 142 CoNG.
REc. S10379-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12,1996) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)).
106. See N.D. CENT. CoDa § 14-07.1-02 (1997) (providing for domestic violence protection
orders); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-03 (1997) (providing for temporary protection orders); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (1997) (establishing penalties for violating a protection order); ND.CFN-r.
CODE § 14-07.1-13 (1997) (stating that a person charged with a domestic violence crime may be
ordered to be prohibited from having contact with the victim if a protection order under either section
14-07.1-02 or section 14.07.1-03 does not already exist); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-01-02 (1995)
(demanding seizure of a dangerous weapon or firearm used or possessed in the act of a felony or
misdemeanor involving violence or intimidation); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-01 (1995) (disallowing
any person convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving violence or intimidation from owning a
firearm for a period of five years).
107. See supra note 94.
108. See Heitkamp, supra note 86, at 10. For the period of 1978-97, 49 percent of deaths due to
homicide in North Dakota involved domestic violence. Heitkamp, supra note 86. at 10.
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like federal legislation such as the Gun Control Act and VAWA, however,
North Dakota offers victims of domestic violence remedies only after the
actual violence has occurred, and its laws do not seek to prevent domestic
violence from occurring. 109 For example, the North Dakota Century
Code allows courts to issue protection orders "[ulpon a showing of
actual or imminent domestic violence." 110 North Dakota law also
provides for temporary protection ordersll and penalties for violations
of such protection orders.11 2 A first violation of such a protection order
is a class A misdemeanor, and any subsequent violation is a class C
felony. 113 Another statute allows a court order, when a protection order
is not already in place, to prohibit a person charged with or arrested for a
domestic violence crime from having contact with the victim. 14
The classification of protection order violations into the categories
of misdemeanors and felonies shows the North Dakota legislature's
awareness of the problem of domestic violence.115 Further, North
Dakota prohibits any person guilty of a felony or a class A misdemeanor
from owning a firearm.116 In addition, firearms involved in a felony or a
misdemeanor that involves violence or intimidation must be forfeited.117
The problem however, is that according to North Dakota law the gun
must first be used. 118 Consequently, there is no preventive mechanism
109. See supra note 106. See also VAWA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701, 13981 (1994). VAWA also
only provides remedies after a crime of violence has occurred. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701, 13981.
110. N.D.Cw. CoDE § 14-07.1-02. This section of the North Dakota Century Code provides for
protection orders for victims of actual or imminent violence. I&
111. See N.D.CNH. Con § 14-07.1-03. As provided by statute, a temporary protection order
allows a court to grant an ex parte temporary protection order, pending a full hearing, based upon an
allegation of a recent incident of actual domestic violence and alleging an immediate and present
danger of domestic violence to the applicant. Id.
112. See N.D.CENr. CoDE § 14-07.1-06.
113. See id
114. ND. CEzur. CODE § 14-07.1-13 (1997).
115. See N.D.CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (1997).
116. N.D.CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-01 (1995). Any person guilty of a felony or class A
misdemeanor when
that crime was committed while using or possessing a firearm or dangerous weapon...
is prohibited from owning a firearm or having one in possession from the date of
conviction and continuing for a period five years after the date of conviction or release
from incarceration or probation, whichever is the latter.
Id.
117. rd. (stating that firearms "used or possessed while in the commission of a felony or a
misdemeanor involving violence or intimidation" must be forfeited).
118. See N.D. CEr. CODE § 62.1-02-01(2) (1995). This provision of the statute states that a
person "convicted of a class A misdemeanor involving violence or intimidation and that crime was
committed while using or possessing a firearm in the act of a felony or misdemeanor involving
violence or intimidation" is prohibited from using or possessing a firearm for a period of five years.
Id. The law clearly states that the firearm must have been used in the commission of the crime. d.
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for the victim.119 Further, despite attempts to prevent it, abusers often
ignore protection orders.120
In another set of laws aimed at domestic violence, the North Dakota
Century Code allows police to take a perpetrator from the location of the
offense to jail, even though the victim may not want to press charges. 121
The law also allows law enforcement officers to arrest an abuser without
a warrant if the abuser is violating a protection order. 122 This is true
even if the officer was not present when the violation occurred,123 and
under some circumstances an officer may arrest a suspected abuser
without a warran. 124
However, these remedies fail to help prevent crimes. 125 Domestic
violence situations often occur suddenly and without warning, preventing
victims from obtaining a protection order and denying officers time to
make arrests and/or seize weapons. 126 The Lautenberg Amendment
seeks to remedy these exact situations by removing guns from abusers
with a history of violent behavior before they have a chance to use
them.127 It seeks to keep guns from the very individuals who have
proven their instability by threatening and beating their own loved
ones. 128 Most importantly, it aims to decrease substantially the number
of domestic violence homicides and allow victims an opportunity to get
119. See U,£
120. Norm DAKOTA CouNcaL oN AnusED WommE's SERacEs, supra note 85 (reporting that "134
batterers violated their protection orders: 60 were arrested for a first violation and 12 were arrested
for a subsequent violation"). See also N.D. CeNr. COD § 14-07.1-06 (1997) (providing that a fir
time protection order violation is a class A misdemeanor and subsequent violations result in a class C
felony).
121. See N.D.CENr. CoDE § 14-07.1-11 (1997). See also ATroRNEY GENERAL HEmi HarimAmo,
DoMVssnc VIOI.uENcE IN NoRTH DAKoTA, 1996. at 23.
122. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-11 (stating that law enforcement officers have the right to
"arrest a person without warrant if the person has committed the offense of violating a protection
order under section 14-07.1-06, whether or not the violation was committed in the presence of the
officer").
123. See id
124. N.D. CENT. CODE 14-07.1-11 (1997) allows an officer to "arrest a person without a warrant
if the arrest is made within four hours from the time the officer determines there is probable cause to
arrest for an assault of a family or household member.., whether or not the assault took place in the
presence of the officer." Id.
125. See supra note 106. All of North Dakota's laws regarding domestic violence provide
remedies only after an act of violence has occurred. See supra note 106.
126. See 142 CoNG. Re. S10379-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray). When
alcohol or other drug use is involved, the abuser may come home in a fit of rage and use a firearm
against his victim. See id. See also Heitkamp, supra note 121, at 19 (stating that substance abuse is a
factor that often contributes to domestic violence).
127. See Laufenberg Amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1997). The Lautenberg
Amendment bans firearm possession by those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors, thus,
proving they have a history of violent behavior. See iU
128. See 142 CoNe. REc. S10377-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg)
(stating that the Lautenberg Amendment will "keep guns away from violent individuals who threaten
their own families, people who have shown that they cannot control themselves and are prone to fits of
violent rage, directed unbelievably enough, against their own loved ones").
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out of their situation alive. 129 This is an opportunity victims do not have
when a gun is pointed in their face and the trigger is pulled. 130 While
North Dakota law provides punishment and remedies after this occurs, it
offers no mechanism to keep it from happening. 13 1
C. JUDICIAL REACTIONS TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Legislative action is only half the story, however. Quite possibly the
most tragic element of domestic violence is the response its victims have
received from society, the criminal justice system and courts.132 The
legislative history behind the Lautenberg Amendment discusses the
"outrageous callousness and disregard"133 some judges have demon-
strated to domestic violence victims. 134 This callousness can be seen in
129. See i. Domestic violence victims are often afrild to press charges against their abusers
because
they are afraid that the guy, the fellow who first treated them to a fist in the face, may
come home with a gun and take their lives... We hope this amendment will send a loud
and clear message that you are not going to get away with this kind of thing, because we
are going to take away your gun. We am going to take away that extra chance that the
woman nght be killed.
Id.
130. See 142 CoNa. Rrc. S10379-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray).
Unfortunately, this amendment will not make life better for many women who are
abused, even when guns are present in the home. We know that most domestic violence
is not even reported, and of the cases that are reported, many do not lead to a conviction
. But for thousands of women and men in this country, this amendment would mean
immediate results. 'To get the gun out of the home will mean the difference between life
and death.
Id.
131. See supra note 106.
132. See Mabbun, supra note 3, at 209-10. Commentators have noted that the growth of domestic
violence has numbed society's awareness of the problem. See Mabbun, supra note 3, at 210 n.7
(citing generally HUTCInNGs. supra note 81). "Further, police label assaults between intimates as
'domestic disturbances' or 'family trouble,' and therapists categorize psychological problems inflicted
by domestic abuse as 'depression,' 'paranoia' or 'anxiety neuroses."' Mabbun, supra note 3, at 210
n.8 (citing generally OKuN, supra note 81). "[Domestic abuse is... often considered to be a personal
family matter, which jurors, police or the general public believe should not be criminalized as assault
and battery." Mabbun, supra note 3, at n.9 (citing Lisa M. Fitzgerald, The Violence Against Women
Act: Is it an Effective Solution?, 1 How. ScRoU.: The Soc. Jus. Rnv. 46,50 (1993)).
133. 142 CoNa. Rec. S10377-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
134. See i.
In Baltimore County (only four years ago] a State circuit courtjudge was hearing a case
involving a man who shot his wife in the head and killed her. As he handed down the
light sentence, with time to be served weekends only, and not a very long time at that, the
judge said that the worse part of his job is, and I quote 'Sentencing noncriminals as
criminals,' as if shooting your wife in the head was not criminal behavior.
Or take the case of a man who tracked down his wife, shot her five times in the face and
killed her. The judge in that case gave the man a minimal sentence to be served on
weekends. In explaining why he was being so lenient, the judge said the victim provoked
her husband by not telling him that she was leaving their abusive marriage.
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the light sentences, including placing the blame on the victims, some
judges have given to men who have murdered their wives. 135 Some
justifications for these light sentences include that domestic abusers are
not criminals and that the victim caused the, violence by leaving the
abusive relationship.' 36
Further, as one commentator notes, "Victims are reluctant to
cooperate [with the judicial system] for fear of more violence." 137
Pressing charges against an abusive domestic partner often aggravates
the situation and makes victims much more vulnerable as their abusers
are merely slapped on the wrist from judges with outdated views on
domestic violence.138 Hence, a federal law is essential to provide
uniformity in combating domestic violence. 3 9
North Dakota has also had problems with judicial attitudes towards
domestic violence. For example, in a recent case, North Dakota Supreme
Court Justice.Mary Maring noted in a concurrence that the trial judge
had found domestic violence in the case mitigated by the fact that the
victim's actions "would have made most reasonable persons commit
.domestic violence." 140 She went on to criticize the judge for failing to
follow Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges
to "perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice."141
Further, the 1996 final report of the North Dakota Commission on
Gender Fairness in the Courts discussed a number of gender fairness
concerns, including "concerns that cases of sexual assault by an
acquaintance might be handled differently than other sexual assault
cases ... ,"142 The Commission also cited survey results indicating
135. See 141
136. See id.
137. 142 CoNe. Rc. S10377-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
138. Furthermore, despite the attitudes of society, there is.still the problem of clogged court
dockets and red tape. See Kerr, supra note 84, at *1. Hennepin County, Minnesota, recently adopted
family court procedures for streamlining domestic abuse proceedings have been only partially
successful in the face of a flood of new restraining-order cases. See Kerr, supra note 84, at *1.
Additional problems include a high volume of cases, increasingly complex domestic situations,
language translation difficulties, insufficient medical evidence and lack of uniformity in the
enforcement of restraining orders which means that the courts cannot give fully detailed attention to
each one. See Kerr, supra note 84, at *1. Often victims of domestic violence are afraid that their
abuser, may come home with a gun and take their lives if they further anger him through legal
proceedings. See Kerr, supra note 84, at *1.
139. The Lautenberg Amendment provides an "across the board" standard that makes it illegal
for all domestic violence misdemeanants to possess guns. See Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1997). By enacting a federal statute such as the Lautenberg Amendment,
there is less discretion left to the courts, leaving less room for the gender bias that many victims face in
a courtroom. See Mabbun, supra note 3, at 210.
140. Huesers v. Huesers, 560 N.W.2d 219,223 (N.D. 1997) (Maring, J., concurring).
141. See id. at 223-24.
142. A DwaRENcE IN PERCEPTIONs: THE FINAL REPORT op THE NoRTH DAKOTA COMlAsIsoN ON
GENDER FAmNass i- urs CoURTs, 72 N.D. L REv. 1113, 1218 (1996).
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perceptions that "defendants (mostly men) convicted of assault in cases
of domestic violence received lighter sentences than do defendants
convicted of other assaults." 143 While the Commission was careful to
characterize its findings as "based primarily on perception data" and
"hampered by lack of accessible system-wide data," the report indicates
that the national problem of the judicial treatment of domestic violence
cases is also a problem, at least to a certain extent, in North Dakota.144
IV. SEVERAL FAILURES AND ONE SHORT-LIVED SUCCESS:
CONSTITUTIONAL ATrACKS ON THE LAUTENBERG
AMENDMENT
The Lautenberg Amendment has been challenged on numerous
constitutional grounds since its enactment. 145 The most noted challenges
have been based on the Second and Tenth Amendments and on due
process, ex post facto and equal protection grounds.146 Courts have
consistently rejected these challenges and declared the Lautenberg
Amendment constitutional. 147
As the Lautenberg Amendment is fairly new legislation, there have
been a limited number of reported decisions on its constitutionality.148
However, one major case, Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis,149 includes
almost all of the constitutional challenges thus far made against the
Amendment.15 0 Mr. Gillespie was employed by the Indianapolis police
department and was in danger of losing his job since, as a result of the
Lautenberg Amendment and a domestic violence misdemeanor convic-
tion, he could no longer possess a firearm.151 Consequently, he made
several constitutional challenges to the Amendment.152
Gillespie first claimed that the Lautenberg Amendment violated his
Second Amendment1 53 right to bear arms both as an individual and as a
143. Id. The study indicated that 69% of women attorneys, 55% of men attorneys, and 33% of
judges thought defendants convicted of domestic assault received generally shorter sentences than
those convicted of other assaults. Id at 1224.
144. rd at 1218-19 (discussing study methodology and results).
145. See supra note 21.
146. See supra note 21.
147. See supra notes 20-21.
148. The Lautenberg Amendment was signed by President Clinton on September 28, 1996. See
Mecka supra note 41, at 625.
149. 13 F.Supp.2d 811 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
150. Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp. 811, 819-28 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (addressing a
claim that the Lautenberg Amendment violated the Tenth and Second Amendments, and the
Commerce, Equal Protection, Due Process, Bill of Attainder, Ex Post Facto, and Contracts Clauses).
151. See t,& at 814,815.
152. See id. at 819, 821-22, 825-27.
153. The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a flee State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms,
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police officer.154 While the court declined to address the issue of wheth-
er the plaintiff had an individual constitutional right to own a gun,S5 it
held that it need not address the issue because, even under the strictest
standard of constitutional review,156 Gillespie's claim failed.15 7 The
court found that the governmental interest of keeping deadly firearms
from dangerous domestic violence offenders was a compelling
interest.158 It also found the Lautenberg Amendment was narrowly
tailored, as it applies only to those convicted of a crime of domestic
violence.15 9
The Gillespie court next rejected the plaintiff's claim that the
Lautenberg Amendment violated the Tenth Amendment1 60 by invading
state sovereignty in three ways: (1) the Lautenberg Amendment
effectively supplanted state criminal law by defining the crime of
domestic violence and establishing substantive penalties for such offense;
(2) the Lautenberg Amendment effectively supplanted state civil law by
dictating qualifications of state and local law enforcement officials; and
(3) the Lautenberg Amendment imposed a duty on States to serve as
implements of regulation. 161
The court's rejection of this claim stated that the Lautenberg
Amendment neither creates nor amends state law, but rather creates
federal law applying only to the Lautenberg Amendment and leaves
states free to "define and punish domestic violence crimes as they
wish."162 In other words, the Lautenberg Amendment is merely a
supplement to state law.163
Gillespie also asserted that the Lautenberg Amendment violated his
due process rights, 164 arguing that his right to own a gun could not be
shall not be infringed:' U.S. Coisr. amend. HI.
154. See Gillespie, 13 F.Supp.2d at 826.
155. See id
156. The highest level of constitutional review is known as "strict scrutiny":
Under this test for determining if there has been a denial of equal protection, burden is
on government to establish necessity of the statutory classification... Measure which is
found to affect adversely a fundamental right will be subject to "strict scrutiny" test
which requires state to establish that it has compelling interest justifying the law and that
distinctions created by law are necessary to further some governmental purpose.
BLACKS LAW DiCnoNARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990).
157. See Gillespie, 13 F.Supp.2d at 827.
158. Id
159. See id.
160. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsr.
amend. X.
161. See Gillespie, 13 F.Supp.2d at 819.
162. Id
163. See id.
164. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § I provides substantive due process rights: "No State shalt make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... :
I. Substantive due process is broadly defined as the constitutional guarantee that a person's life,
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removed arbitrarily and without the due process afforded to him by the
Constitution.165 On this issue, the court held that because Gillespie's
right to possess a firearm was not a fundamental right,166 it need only be
analyzed under the rational basis test.167 The court held the Lautenberg
Amendment satisfied this rational basis test because of the state's legiti-
mate interest in keeping firearms away from domestic violence
offenders.168
The court also rejected Gillespie's procedural due process claim:
"[W]hen the legislature passes a law which affects a general class of
persons, those persons have all received procedural due process the
legislative process."169 Other courts have also answered due process
claims by holding that the Lautenberg Amendment "plainly sets forth
the conduct which it prohibits and to whom it applies."170 The Lauten-
berg Amendment clearly states that a domestic violence misdemeanant
may not possess a gun, meaning there is therefore no violation of due
process; the offender has been informed of the restrictions through the
plain language of the Amendment. 171 Thus, the offender has received
notice of the implications of his conduct, which is sufficient to satisfy
due process.17?
liberty, or property shall not be arbitrarily taken. See BLAcKs LAw DicnoNARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990).
Procedural due process rights are derived from the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which states:
"No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsr.
amend. V.
165. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. See also Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 825.
166. A fundamental right is one that has its source explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
United States Constitution. See BLACKS LAW DICTnONARY 674 (6th ed. 1990). While the Second
Amendment is an explicit constitutional right, the court in Gillespie followed the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Second Amendment:
[I'n the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of
a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time
has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the
right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial
notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that
its use could contribute to the common defense.
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). Although Gillespie does not quote this language
directly, it does refer to this quote as the Supreme Court's position on the Second Amendment.
Gillespie. 13 F. Supp.2d at 825.
167. The rational basis test. a standard of review for statutory enactments challenged on equal
protection grounds, requires that "classifications created by a state must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumnstanced shall be treated alike." BLACKS LAW Di nONARY
1262 (6th ed. 1990).
168. See Gilespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 825. In response to Gillespie's equal protection claim, the
court held that the Lautenberg Amendment passed the rational basis test because it did not infringe on
any fundamental rights and was rationally related to the legitimate government interest of keeping
guns away from potentially dangerous persons. Id.
169. Gillespie, 13 F.Supp.2d at 825.
170. See United States v. Hicks, 992 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (D. Kan. 1997).
171. See id.
172. See id.
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The ex post facto challenges173 to the Lautenberg Amendment
assert that it is unconstitutional because it punishes past crimes.174 For
example, a person convicted twenty-five years ago of a domestic vio-
lence crime will lose his or her current ability to possess a firearm as a
result. of this statute. 175 The courts have responded to this particular
challenge by holding that the Amendment merely penalizes the
possession of a firearm after the date the statute was enacted. 176 This
means that the crime of being a domestic violence misdemeanant in
possession of a firearm is not committed until after the effective date of
the statute. 177 There would be an ex post facto violation if the
Lautenberg Amendment punished domestic violence offenders who had
possessed a firearm at any time after their convictions. 78 However, the
Lautenberg Amendment defines a new crime, being a domestic violence
offender in possession of a firearm after the 1996 enactment of the
Amendment.17 9 Hence, there is no ex post facto violation.' 80
Despite the rejection of these constitutional challenges, one attack
prevailed in August of 1998.181 In Fraternal Order of Police I, the
United States Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia held the
Lautenberg Amendment violated the Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause.l82
The court based its holding on the Amendment's lack of exceptions
for law enforcement, military, or government officials who were found
guilty of a domestic violence misdemeanor, while the Gun Control Act
provided an exemption for those convicted of domestic violence
felonies.183 The court found that providing a harsher penalty for domes-
173. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 825; Hicks, 992 F. Supp. at 1245; United States v. Meade, 986
F. Supp. 66, 69 (D. Mass. 1997); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp.
1564, 1575 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
174. The U.S. Constitution prevents both federal and state governments from enacting ex post
facto laws. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 9, cl.3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 'MEx post facto laws" are
laws "passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes
the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed:' BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 580 (6th ed.
1990).
175. See Lautenberg Amendment of 1996. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1997) (making it illegal
for anyone ever convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor to own or possess a firearm).
176. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 825-26 n.11. See also Mead, 986 F. Supp. at 69; Barrett.
968 F. Supp. at 1575,1576; Hicks, 922 F. Supp. at 1246.
177. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 826.
178. Id.
179. See Hicks, 922 F. Supp. at 1246.
180. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 825-26. See also Mead, 986 F. Supp. at 69; Barrett, 968
F.Supp. at 1575-76; Hicks, 922 F. Supp. at 1246.
181. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States (Fraternal Order of Police 1), 152 F.3d 998
(D.C. Cir. 1998). rev'd, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding the Lautenberg Amendment violates
equal protection because it provides a harsher penalty for misdemeanants than for felons).
182. Fraternal Order of Police I. 152 F.3d at 1004.
183. The Gun Control Act of 1968 provides an exemption for law enforcement, military and
government officials who are convicted of felonies. See Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §
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tic violence misdemeanants than for domestic violence felons violated
equal protection.18 4 Therefore, the court ruled that the exemption por-
tion of the Amendment was unconstitutional, and so law enforcement,
military and government officials must be permitted to retain firearms
for their official duties. 185 Although the court left the rest of the
Amendment intact, this ruling allowed domestic violence criminals to
possess firearms, 186 further endangering their victims.1 8 7
This decision was short lived, however. Upon a petition for
rehearing by the United States, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals in Fraternal Order of Police II reversed its prior decision. 188
Therefore, abusers convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors cannot
legally possess a firearm in any capacity, no matter their job
description. 8 9
The court justified its reversal by quoting former Supreme Court
Justice Frankfurter: 'Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought
not to reject it merely because it comes late." 190 In this case, the wisdom
came in the form of an unconventional look at the Congressional intent
behind the Lautenberg Amendment.191 At first glance, the Court admits
that treating misdemeanants more harshly than felons "seems irrational
in the conventional sense of that term."192 However, the Court further
analyzed society's treatment of misdemeanants versus felons, finding
that while society often keeps felony behavior in close check, its attitude
towards misdemeanants is much more lax, creating the dangerous
loopholes that the Lautenberg Amendment was designed to close.193
922(g)(1) (1994). See also 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1). However, the Lautenberg does not provide the
same exemptions for those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1).
184. See Fraternal Order of Police I, 152 F3d at 1004.
185. See id.
186. See id. Thus. itisstillgenerally
unlawful for any person . . .who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in
or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1997). However, a convicted offender
who is in the capacity of law enforcement, military, or government official will be exempted from the
Amendment. See Fraternal Order of Police I, 152 F3d at 1004.
187. See Su.GLicK Er AL., Wm MEN MuoirWOM: AN ANALYSts OF 1996 HOMCDE DATA 3
(Violence Policy Center ed., 1998). "There were 398 women shot and killed by their husband or
intimate acquaintance during the course of an argument-more than one woman murdered every day
of the year." Id. See also 142 CONG. REc. S10379-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Murray) (staling that the gun is the ingredient most likely to turn a domestic violence incident into a
homicide).
188. See Fratemal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
189. See id
190. See id. at 900-01 (quoting Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Henslee v. Union Planters Nat.
Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595.600 (1949)).
191. See id. at 903-04.
192. See id at 903.
193. See id. at 903-04:
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Thus, "When the government is faced with a 'practical determination'
like this one, we are obliged to accept 'rough,' even 'illogical' solutions
with an 'imperfect fit between means and ends."'194
In reality, it was not the intent of the Lautenberg Amendment to
treat domestic violence misdemeanants more severely than domestic
violence felonies.195 The lack of exemptions for law enforcement,
military personnel and government officials within the Lautenberg
Amendment was simply the result of the opposition's tactics to cause the
Amendment to fail.196 In order to weaken the bill before its approval,
opponents led a last-minute effort to modify the Amendment by
removing the "official-use" exception. 197 However, the end result of
Fraternal Order of Police 11 serves as a much-needed protection for
victims of domestic violence.
(O]n reflection it appears to us not unreasonable for Congress to believe that existing
laws and practices adequately deal with the problem of issuance of official firearms to
felons but not to domestic violence misdemeanants-adequately at least in the sense of
explaining how Congress might have found that as to felons the net benefit of federal
prohibition (and non-exemption) fell below the net benefit of prohibition and
non-exemption as to misdemeanants. Although state laws do not uniformly ban felons
from possessing guns . . . nonlegal restrictions such as formal and informal hiring
practices may, as the government argues, prevent felons from being issued firearms
covered by Sec. 925(a)(1) in a large measure of the remaining cases.
Id.
194. See id. at 904 (citing Heller v. Doe. 509 U.S. 312. 321 (1993)).
195. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The purpose of the Amendment was to remove firearms from
those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors. Id. The Amendment was meant to remedy the
problem of abusers entering plea bargains to avoid a felony conviction and to supplement insufficient
state law. See 142 Cong. Rec. S 10379-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray). See
also 142 Cong. Rec. H10434-01 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Schroeder).
196. See Mecka, supra'note 41, at 632. At the last minute before the bill was passed, the
"official-use" exceptions were removed from the Amendment. See Mecka, supra note 41, at 632.
Senator Lautenberg explained that "the Congressional Republicans 'were threatening to hold up the
whole show on this and we had to swallow it or risk seeing the whole appropriations bill crash:'
Mecka, supra note 41, at 632 n.135. '"ow it looks like it was intended to undermine the bill all along."
Mecka, supra note 41, at 632 n.135.
197. See Mecka, supra note 41, at 632. The "official-use" exception is the exemptions portion of
the Gun Control Act of 1968 which states that law enforcement, military, and government officials are
not prohibited from possessing firearms in their official capacity even if convicted of a domestic
violence felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 925. In the original draft of the Lautenberg Amendment, section 925
also held these same exemptions. See Kerr, supra note 77, at *I.
A staffperson in Senator Lautenberg's office confirmed that removal of the 925(a)
exemption came only after a private ultimatiun from House Republicans, who gave in on
nearly every other objection to the bill. It was either that or lose the entire bill. It was a
tough decision, but being left with-that ultimatum, the Senator felt he had no choice.
Id.
Republican Representative Robert Barr of Georgia, who led the way in excluding the
exemptions portion of the Lautenberg Amendment, has been labeled a poster boy for the National
Rifle Association as a result of his high rating by the pro-gun lobby organization. See Kerr, supra note
77 at *1. It is possible to deduce from Representative Barr's gun lobby efforts that his motives for
removing the exemptions portion of the Lautenberg Amendment were not objective, as it is difficult to
understand why a gun lobbyist attempted to remove someone's Second Amendment rights. See Kerr,
supra note 77, at * 1.
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As a result of Fraternal Order of Police I, more women were again
in danger of having a firearm used against them in a domestic crime,
although the bulk of the Amendment was left intact and only the section
925 exemptions portion of the statute were found unconstitutional. 198
After the recent decision in Fraternal Order of Police II, though,
domestic violence victims are again afforded protection under the
Lautenberg Amendment. 199 The fate of the Amendment, however, is
uncertain: The opposite decisions in Fraternal Order of Police I and II
show that its constitutionality is not entirely clear, and it is likely to
remain so unless or until it is appealed to the Supreme Court for a final
decision on its constitutionality.
After the initial holding of Fraternal Order of Police I, several bills
were introduced to the 105th Congress that would have amended the
Lautenberg Amendment provisions.200 In particular, one bill would have
provided that the ban on firearm possession by domestic violence
offenders would not apply to government entities, such as police and the
military.201 Another bill proposed that any firearm prohibitions
resulting from the Lautenberg Amendment would not apply if the
conviction occurred before the Amendment became law.202 The 105th
Congress enacted neither of these bills, nor any others, and it is not clear
whether it will do so in the future. 203
V. CONCLUSION
The Lautenberg Amendment is essential in the fight against
domestic violence.204 State domestic violence laws are insufficient either
because they do not consider certain acts of domestic violence criminal
or because offenses are so often plea bargained to a lesser offense. 205
Therefore, the pre-Lautenberg Amendment legislation which bars
convicted felons from possessing firearms will not affect most domestic
198. See Fraternal Order ofPollce 4 152 F3d at 1004 (holding that domestic violence offenders
who are military, law enforcement, or government officials may possess firearms for their official
duties). See also GLICK Er AL., supra note 187, at 3. See also 142 Cong. Rec. S10379-01 (daily ed.
Sept. 12, 1996) (Statement of Sen. Murray).
199. See Fraternal Order of Police 1, 173 F.3d at 901 (holding that the original Amendment,
including the "no exemptions" portion, is constitutional).
200. See Letter from Byron L. Dorgan, U.S. Senator, to Jodi Nelson (Dec. 1, 1998) (on file with
author).
201. See id.
202. See id
203. See id.
204. Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1997).
205. See 142 Cong. Rec. S 10377-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
See also 142 Cong. Rec. H10434-01 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder); 142
Cong. Rec. S10379-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray) (stating that "plea
bargains often result in misdemeanor convictions for what are really felon crimes").
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violence offenders, as they are usually convicted of only
misdemeanors.2 06
The purpose of the Lautenberg Amendment is not to prohibit
law-abiding citizens from purchasing guns.207 It applies only to citizens
who have already been convicted of a crime of domestic violence.208
Today, most homicides committed against women are not committed by
a criminal on a dark street.2 09 Their attacker is not usually a depraved
stranger.210 The harsh reality is that in many instances the perpetrator is
her husband or boyfriend. 211 The Lautenberg Amendment is necessary
because in too many domestic violence cases, "the only difference
between a battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a
gun." 2 1 2
Jodi L. Nelson
206. See sources cited supra note 205.
207. See 142 Cong. Rec. S10377-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12. 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
208. See id.
209. See GLICK ET A., supra note 187, at 1.
210. See GIcK ET AL., supra note 187, at 1.
211. See GUCK ET AL., supra note 187, at 12.
212. 142 Cong. Rec. S 10377-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
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